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OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION - WHAT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT?
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM*
These are difficult times in which to pursue state constitutional revi-
sion. This is not to speak discouragingly of the enterprise. It is, rather,
to be realistic about the psychic, social, economic and political complexities
of life at this stage in the course of human affairs. I need only to suggest
that one reflect upon the extraordinary changes in community life and in
the human condition generally since the Ohio Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1912 and bear in mind that state constitutions have not been polit-
ical documents written for the ages.
Our task is to discuss Ohio constitutional revision in relation to local
government. The facts of life tell us to pursue the matter in larger than
state context. We must be conscious of all major levels of community
from the world community to the tiny village. Such is the interdepen-
dence of the members of the genus homo.
While one does not see local government in direct relationship with
the world community or an international regional community, there are
pervasive problems that should be of common concern, notably restora-
tion of a sound system of relationship of man to the natural order and the
achievement of a system of social order free of the overhang of nuclear
armament. We have a national government with responsibility in external
as well as internal affairs with respect to such matters. What it does as to
them plainly conditions what state and local units may do in their spheres.
On the domestic scene the national government stands astride a na-
tional economy with unique capacity both to influence economic life and
to draw upon the private sector for communal purposes. What may be
beyond its broad power of direct action may yet be influenced very strongly
by the leverage of federal funds. So much is this the case that generally
the mass media and many people simply assume and commonly refer to
local units as acting under federal aid programs with authority drawn from
the national government itself, when actually the national government
is only making donations or grants subject to conditions attached to those
grants.
The lesson in all this for me is not that state and local governments are
headed for limbo. I do not believe for a moment that they are. The coun-
try is so large, so complex and so diverse that some decentralization in
decision making and administration is indispensable. Moreover, local
autonomy is a political value that is far from dead. As with so many of
the problems which vex us, there are roles for all levels of government.
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The lesson for those concerned with state constitutional revision is that
the states should strive to maintain the greatest flexibility of action. They
should direct constitutional change to strengthening basic state and local
governmental institutions and processes, with stress upon responsible ac-
tion rather than upon limitation of authority. Additionally, I stress that,
according to my best lights, this is the fundamental undertaking with which
the state constitutional revision commission is charged.
I. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
Local government should be viewed in relationship to the basic state
policymaking body, the legislature. I do not have the legislature of Ohio
particularly in mind when I say that our political system has defaulted
with respect to the provision of a strong, representative body at the state
level. That institution is the key organ both in general policymaking
and in the distribution, within the constitutional framework, of responsi-
bility and authority for decision making and execution. This bears perva-
sively upon local government, viewed in the large, even in a home rule
jurisdiction. Thus, I go afield to say that a central concern of a state
constitutional convention, or whatever method you use to achieve change,
is to go as far as possible in strengthening representative government.
We cannot do it by polling the citizenry, however clearly we recognize
that the problems and the decisions are of primary concern to them. I
put it this way because legislatures as institutions unhappily occupy a low
place in the public's esteem, a long-existent condition which does not
encourage reform efforts.
The voters of Ohio have already responded to the Supreme Court's
one-man one-vote principle by establishing through constitutional amend-
ment a fixed membership for both houses of the legislature with a single-
member district pattern of 99 house seats, upon which is superimposed
33 single-member senatorial districts, each covering three contiguous house
districts." The design is to avoid crossing county lines in defining house
districts where the population ratio for such districts is less than county
population, thus taking into consideration local governmental institutions
and concerns.
Does this have any special significance for local government? In gen-
eral, one-man one-vote has afforded more representation from the sub-
urbs. They are the areas of major population growth, but I am afraid
that this does not provide assurance of greater legislative sensitivity to
central city problems or problems of regional perspective. The explana-
tion for this is found in human nature. There are great differences in
human orientations, interests and outlooks. Many people live in the sub-
1 OHIO CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 11 (1967).
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urbs, in part at least, to achieve insulation from the urgent and perplexing
problems of the central city.
Should the state constitution speak expressly on the subject of repre-
sentation on local governing bodies? The Supreme Court has applied
one-man one-vote to general function local units like counties and cities,
towns and villages, and even to an elective junior college district, the
board of which had taxing and borrowing power 3 This last ruling is
rather extraordinary because it did not involve a body of general legisla-
tive competence or responsibility. It is my notion that it would be just as
well to have the constitution remain silent on the matter. The subject is
still undergoing development in Supreme Court adjudication and there
are related matters, such as the impact of multi-member districts upon
racial and political groups, which are yet in a somewhat unsettled state,
despite the recent rejection in 1971 by the high Court of an attack upon
multi-member legislative districts in the neighboring states of Indiana
and New York.'
II. POPULAR LEGISLATION
In 1912 an Ohio constitutional amendment made general provision for
the initiative and referendum in municipalities, but left it to the legisla-
ture to implement the general scheme by providing the appropriate pro-
cedure.' The legislature borrowed from the constitutionally articulated
state-level scheme and ordained that an ordinance adopted expressly as an
emergency measure would not be subject to referendum. Since the Ohio
courts do not review the finding of emergency-in other words, they take
the declaration of emergency by the local governing body as final-the lo-
cal governing body has been left in the saddle so far as the referendum
is concerned.7 The significance of this from the standpoint of the relative
dignity of action by the legislative body must be obvious. The voters,
who might be described as the sovereign in the local unit, do not really
have the ultimate voice by referendum. They may, however, through
the initiative, repeal an emergency ordinance.8
It is to be observed that the legislative hand in this matter has not
made the ultimate disposition of it. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held
that home rule power does extend to this subject, so a charter municipal-
ity may regnlate the relationship of councilmanic action to voter action
2 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
3 Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
4 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (State legislature).
5 Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (county governing body).
8 OHIo CONST. art. II, § Lf.
7 State ex rel. Fostoria v. King, 154 Ohio St. 213, 94 NE.2d 697 (1950).
8 State ex rel. Sharpe v. Hitt, 155 Ohio St. 529, 99 N.E.2d 659 (1951).
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in a way to outlaw the emergency clause device and give popular legisla-
tion higher dignity than councilmanic action.'
It seems to me that there is no evident need for express constitutional
provision for popular legislation in municipalities, at least so long as voter
participation in policymaking can be provided for in a home rule charter.
In that framework, popular lawmaking is optional with the local com-
munity.
There is the basic question of whether popular lawmaking should even
be available at the local level. I have no serious doubt that it should. I
say this with awareness of recent experience supporting the view that the
voters are likely to be less receptive to proposals, like fair housing mea-
sures designed to promote equality of opportunity without regard to group
characteristics, than are elected representatives. ° The latter are not al-
ways warmly committed to human rights but they are conscious of the po-
litical force of minority groups. This state of affairs is troubling but
the ultimate test of a just society, in any event, is whether the people at
large support equality before the law and equality of opportunity. We
must bear in mind, moreover, that there are judicial restraints upon all law-
makers in our system.
Whether tax and appropriation measures for regular governmental
operations should be subjects of popular legislation is definitely another
matter. I am quite dearly of the opinion that they should not. To leave
appropriations and tax measures, which are necessary for essential public
services and the stable and orderly conduct of local affairs, to action by
the voters would not afford assurance that the needs of the given com-
munity would be served.
III. HoME RULE
I do not wish to "upstage" the discussion of the subject of home rule
which is to follow. I shall not dwell on it, but I would rot do justice to
my assignment were I not to take it into account in a general overview of
the problems of local government from a constitutional perspective in
Ohio.
I had occasion some years ago, when I was in Ohio, to do some research
in this area. In the process I researched the records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1912. I found them a very interesting study."' It should
be noted that back in 1912, the delegates-at least some of them-at the
9 State ex rel. Daniels v. Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 N.E2d 913 (1939).
10 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 285 (1969) (mandatory referendum under home rule
charter on fair housing ordinance invalidated under equal protection clause). In 1971 the
Court upheld a California constitutional requirement of a local referendum on a low rent hous-
ing project. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The immediate point is that reliance
on the referendum device discloses an underlying attitude as to c I rights measures.
11 Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and , 9 O-o ST. LJ. 18
(1948).
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State Constitutional Convention were quite aware that the traditional
home rule concept of a grant of home rule power which was rested upon a
distinction between municipal affairs, as to which home rule obtained, and
state concerns, where legislative superiority and primacy controlled, was
rationally and pragmatically vulnerable. They questioned it, and I agree
with them. It is a queasy and shifting business. 12  Governmental func-
tions are not inherently either state or local in nature. What might be
held to be local at one stage of the game might, a few years later, be ju-
dicially regarded, because of change in societal conditions, as of such a
general character as to be identified as a state concern. 3 So the delegates
at the convention tried to do something about this. They eschewed the
example of California and other states which had embraced the old for-
mulation, the old dichotomy. Unhappily, what they did, I think, was not
essentially different. The Ohio provision, § 3 of article XVHI of the state
constitution, confers upon municipalities all powers of local self-govern-
ment. I am afraid that phrase does not really move us very far. It still
demands a determination as to whether a particular matter is local or state.
I think this is amply demonstrated by experience in the case law in this
state since 1912."4
It is very interesting that among the delegates at the convention in 1912
was a member of the history faculty of the Ohio State University, Pro-
fessor George W. Knight, who articulated a home rule theory which in
much more recent years has had large influence. The idea was one which
urban leaders in the state were pressing at the time. He said so at the
convention.
Professor Knight believed that the constitutional grant of home rule
should not be like that in California. He espoused a broad grant to mu-
nicipalities, that were to have home rule status, of all powers that the leg-
islature might, within its plenary competence, confer upon local govern-
ment, always subject to the paramount authority of the legislature to im-
pose by general statute such limitations, exceptions or exclusions as it should
find desirable in the general interest. In other words, a home rule char-
ter municipality would have a broad sweep of authority except as might
be limited by its charter or by general legislation. This dispensation would
generally eliminate the necessity of running to the legislature now and
again for enabling legislation as to this or that. It would, moreover, im-
pose political accountability upon the legislature for any limitations it
might impose.
12 One recalls the strong language of Judge McFarland as early as 1903. He spoke in frus-
tration of those indescribable wild words "municipal affairs:' Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204,
213, 214, 74 P. 780, 784 (1903).
1 3 Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Or. 578, 54 P.2d 1169 (1936) (regulation of speed of motor
vehicles).
14Note particularly the case of State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio Sr. 191, 151
N.E.2d 722 (1958).
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This conception, it seemed to me, involved a very sound and flexible
approach, and I articulated it in a draft of Model Constitutional Provi-
sions for Municipal Home Rule in 19 53 .1' The "Model" was published
by the American Municipal Association, now known as the National
League of Cities.
Perhaps it is not inappropriate to note that in a number of states the
constitutions now embrace this -approach. In October 1971, the State of
Missouri, which was the first state to embrace home rule, adopted a consti-
tutional amendment which puts aside the old dichotomy and embraces
the Knight concept. 6
Fairly early in the game, the 1912 Ohio grant of substantive powers
was interpreted to extend directly to all municipalities and, thus, did not
depend upon the adoption of a home rule charter.17 This is a very impor-
tant distinction. A city or village did not have to adopt a charter to have
all powers of local self-government. So the principal advantage in adopt-
ing a charter was not to have an instrument which granted powers; the
principal advantage was the freedom afforded to set up a framework of
government. It was indeed significant from that standpoint. And there
was a further advantage. A city or village could disavow powers; it could
exclude powers by express provision in a home rule charter. Under
this concept you certainly did not have to look to a charter as a source of
authority. The enablement was taken care of by the direct grant in the
constitution.
It is interesting, however, that of the hundreds of villages in the state-
units of less than five thousand-very few have drafted and adopted
home rule charters. A great many of them pay little attention to home
rule; they simply operate under the general statutes. This was the case
twenty years ago and I would be surprised to find that not still so.
I doubt that anybody who is generally disposed in favor of home
rule would like the idea of taking home rule power outright away from
the villages, so that one way to handle this would be to change the consti-
tutional scheme and say, as the Model Constitutional Provisions do,18 that
the local unit, whether small or large, would have substantive home rule
powers only if it adopted a charter. If it adopted a home rule charter of
government, it would have the plenary grant of home rule power. This is
significant for units, large and small, because it draws a clear line between
those with home rule status and those which operate under general law.
Here let us return briefly to one-man one-vote. I know of no judicial
decision to guide us, but I find it clear enough in principle that one-man
15This was a pamphlet publication which may be cited as FORDHAM, MODEL CONSrTrU-
TIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNIcIPAL HOME RULE (American Municipal Association, 1953).
16 Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 19, 19a.
'7 Perrysburgv. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
18 Fordham, supra note 15, § 6.
(Vol. 3
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYMPOSIUM
one-vote applies to the election of a home rule charter commission. Such
an election relates to the very organization of local government. A home
rule charter is the organic law of the community.
IV. REGIONAL PROBLEMS
The terribly difficult and vexing matter of regional problems is some-
thing to which we could devote weeks. The most I am able to do now is
to touch on it and to try not to leave it completely in shadow.
The first question is: In order to enable appropriate action with relation
to urban regionalism, is it enough simply to rely upon the plenary power
of the legislature? As all of us know-lawyers and non-lawyers alike--
the theory of our national union involves the concept that the legislative
powers of the state legislatures are plenary. They are full and complete,
except as they may be limited by the federal constitution or state constitu-
tion or may be restricted by limitations implicit in the federal system.
Put a little differently, the question is: Why would it not be enough
simply to rely upon that one little clause in the first section of the legisla-
tive article of the state constitution which vests the legislative power of the
state in the legislature? (Subject, of course, to whatever provision is made
for initiative and referendum.)
Problems of regionalism are so difficult and so complex that there has
been a disposition on the part of other states, which have engaged in con-
stitutional revision recently, and the authors of the Model State Consti-
tution 9 to include a broad provision authorizing intergovernmental co-
operation, not only with other local units in the immediate area but also
with the state, with units in another state, and with the national govern-
ment. I am not sure of all the implications of provisions of this sort,
but the justification for their inclusion is that the need for intergovern-
mental cooperation is so great that it is best to go ahead and be explicit
on the subject. I do not quarrel with this approach although, in general,
I believe in a simple pattern of operation under the very broad plenary
authority of the legislature.
The existing Ohio constitutional provision for county home rule rec-
ognizes that problems overreach municipalities and townships and that
countywide jurisdiction may be desirable.20 It does not, however, permit
county assumption of jurisdiction over township and municipal affairs with-
out clearing the incredibly high hurdle of the well-known four-way vote
in the governmental units in the county. As a consequence, the achieve-
ment of county home rule in Ohio is almost out of the question. I must
say that I have no fresh formula to promote, but I do hold myself free to
19 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, Art. X, (6th ed.
1963).
20 OHUo CONST. am X, §§ 3, 4.
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say that the political obstacles to county jurisdiction and perspective should
be greatly reduced. I leave it to the wisdom of the constitutional revi-
sion commission to come forward with a method of doing it.
Of course, county lines do not necessarily define an urban region and,
thus, a county approach may not fit the needs in this or that region. There
should be the flexibility to permit recognition of a regional configuration,
which does not fit necessarily into a county pattern but might overlap
several counties. So, I suggest that a constitutional authorization of inter-
governmental cooperation be on a very flexible basis.
In the recent revision of the Pennsylvania constitution there is a grant
of such authority and, beyond that, the legislature has been authorized to
'provide for government of areas involving two or more local units, which
is a kind of micro-regionalism.2' One interesting question about this is:
What do you do with home rule in relation to regionalism? It does seem
that there is need for a general functional unit of local government upon
which to confer home rule power. We have not devised anything like
that, apart from the county unit, which comprehends a region. Certainly
the county unit is available, although not highly developed in many states.
Another possibility would be the creation of an overlay of government of
a regional character which had powers and responsibilities relating to
matters which were regional in sweep, and with respect to which the re-
gional government would have the appropriate territorial jurisdiction. It
would be a little unusual to have the concept of home rule apply to such
a unit because, to begin with, it would be a limited kind of government and
some fashioning would have to be done. But why might not a unit of
that character be given power of home rule quality, that is, full power
insofar as its particular functions were concerned? In any event, these
are some of the considerations which I am sure will be given very pro-
found and constructive thought in the deliberations of the constitutional
revision commission.22
V. ENVIRONMENT
The environment affects local government directly and it assuredly in-
volves us all. It is true that a good deal of talk about this subject may
not be profound, but this is far from saying that the advocates of ecologi-
cal action at all levels of government have been operating on a foolish
basis. The underlying concern is profoundly well grounded. The basic
fact is that man is a creature of nature; he is not something apart. His
very future depends upon his recognition that he must live as a part of
21 pA. CONST. art. 9, § 7.
22 Of course, there is interest in decentralization as well as regionalism, particularly in larger
urban units. The recently revised California constitutional provisions expressly authorize a
home rule city to provide in its charter for "subgovernment in all or part" of the city, art. 11, §
5.
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nature; he is not above it; he is no less a part of it than the robins and the
bluejays. If he tries to depart from this in a way that involves, for ex-
ample, unlimited growth in the sense of resource consumption and of pro-
ductivity for an increasing population, he will continue, as Jacques Cous-
teau has said, to make the seas a cesspool and to damage the other major
components of our environment to an extent which may be irremediable.
So, I say that all levels of government are, of necessity, involved in
environmental problems. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 speaks to the
subject.' The instrument speaks, as to ecology, from the standpoint both
of individual rights and of declared state public policy to provide and
maintain a healthful environment. The individual may enforce his right
against any party, governmental or private, through legal proceedings sub-
ject to reasonable legislative limitation or regulation.
It remains to be seen how this broad commitment works. I have
been troubled by the thought in the past that grand phrases in the or-
ganic law might so far outmatch the realities of policy effectuation as to
raise doubt as to putting them in at all. The Illinois provisions do seem
to me, however, to have substantial potential for legislative and judicial
implementation. I say this with recognition that they present to a logical
mind some very real questions.
VI. PUBLIC EDUCATION
While public education is a major subject unto itself, which bespeaks
the fullest independent consideration, traditional decentralization in public
school systems brings them within the overview of this local government
seminar. I am certain of that.
At the present time the financing of primary and secondary education,
with basic reliance upon the local property tax, is under severe strain.
Education is absorbing over 50 per centum of ad valorem tax receipts
throughout the country. In the most recent year for which I have figures,
1969, the total of local property taxes was about 30 or 31 billion dollars
in the country and over half of that went to educational purposes for the
local schools. 4 This kind of reliance upon the local property tax has
created a situation that presents grave difficulty by itself. Even so, on the
average, state and federal funds cover more than 40 per centum of the
total devoted to schools. At the same time it is to be noted that taxable
values in school districts vary widely over a given state, and, unless there
is genuine state equalization on an egalitarian basis, the amount spent per
pupil will vary widely over the state.
The Supreme Court of California, in the recent case of Serrano v.
2 3 
ILL. CoNsT. art. XL
24 State Aid to Local Government 36 (Advisory Comm'r on Intergovernmental Relations,
Washington, D.C., April, 1969).
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Priest,25 held as a matter of law, that to make the quality of primary and
secondary education a function of the wealth in a school district-the
court equated wealth with taxable values-denies students and parent tax-
payers in poor districts equal protection of the law under the 14th amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States.
What the court was saying is that we must take the state as the unit for
determining equal protection of the law in relation to school financing.
Presumably the wealth factor would be supportable if the state were the
property taxing unit and there were state equalization of tax assessments.
It is interesting to note that the challenge was to discrepancies, variations
or discrimination among districts, not individuals, which is the more com-
mon way that an equal protection question is raised, for the sound reason
that the safeguard is for the individual.
I have little doubt that the question presented in the California case
will reach the Supreme Court of the United States in the near future."
Even if the high court were to reject the constitutional attack, the actual-
ities will still be with us. This suggests reexamination of all the states'
policies with respect to public school financing. There is little doubt that
there will be major change in the financing of public school systems over
the country. Whether school districts may be redefined in larger units
so that the tax bases will be roughly equal or whe.her school financing
may become strictly a state burden, and how federal aid may be employed
remain to be seen. I predict that the movement will be toward state
financing with federal supplementation. The large district device might
produce marked geographic irregularity and otherwise be insensitive to
considerations other than "wealth."
Anyone who is concerned with state constitutional revision in Ohio or
any other state has to take into account this kind of problem and this
kind of thinking. Serrano may not be the answer. It is obviously sim-
plistic and leaves one with other reservations, but it does give the courts a
handle of justiciability and it deals with a very real condition of educa-
tional inequality that is national in reach. Certainly, it is conceivable
that the courts, as they have done with respect to redistricting and reap-
portionment, may force the hands of the state legislatures and perhaps
the people of the state as to constitutional revision directed toward achiev-
ing patterns of school financing, providing educational opportunity in
our public schools on a more egalitarian basis.
It is necessary to add, with respect to education, that concern for local
autonomy in public school affairs is something that is ubiquitous in this
country. As a matter of fact, at one time we had over one hundred
255 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,96 Cal. Reptr. 601 (1971).
20 Since this paper was prepared, a federal case in which the Serr,.no doctrine was embraced
has reached the Supreme Court. Rodriquez v. San Antonio Independ.nt School District, 337 F.
Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971, 1972), prob. juris. noted 406 U.S. 966 (1972).
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thousand school districts, and most schools are operated independently of
the cities. About 75 per centum of our school-age children are in schools
which are operated by independent school districts. Today the number
of school districts is less than a fifth of what it was at the peak. It is
under 20,00027 and, of course, this has been forced by a recognition that
very small districts are generally not viable in terms of tax base, size of the
community, and size of the student population.
Let me say, insofar as Ohio is concerned, that the state might wish to
retain a strong commitment to public education in its constitution, as it
does now. There is a constitutional provision which calls upon the legis-
lature to provide a good system of public education.2 1 Many states have
such provisions, and Ohio may wish to continue to do this. Whether it
should be disposed to go so far as to make it plain that the total tax burden
should be on the state is another matter. The new Illinois constitution
seems to go just about that far. It provides that "the state has the primary
responsibility for financing the system of public education." -'
VII. LOCAL FINANCE
We come, at this juncture, to the general subject of local finance. As
to that the commission has an enormous challenge of great difficulty.
Societal and governmental changes have outrun the existing dispensation,
as you find it under most state constitutions, including that of Ohio.
First, on the revenue side, there is the familiar long-time reliance
upon the property tax. The levy in this state is subject to a constitutional
ceiling of one per centumn of assessed valuation, a ceiling which may be
exceeded with electoral approval in the given taxing unit or as provided
by home rule charter.30 The question recurs: Is it wise to leave decision-
making on taxation needed to keep public education or basic municipal
services going at an acceptable level to the voters at the polls? I repeat
that I do not think so.
I understand that our Swiss friends, to whom we owe the initiative and
referendum, live with arrangements which make taxation and appropria-
tions subject to referendum. That is not a model for American society.
If Ohio is to retain the property tax, the policy set by the constitution of
setting a low rate limitation which may be exceeded only with elector ap-
proval should be abandoned.
I make bold to challenge the whole property tax system. I think it is
a very dubious basic tax. Of course, it is a natural thing to use. Our
antecedents used it in England, and it is obvious that property is a ready
2 7 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF TE STATES 295 (1970-71). The number
reported for 1966 was 23,335 and 20,406 for 196S.
2 8 OMo CONST. art VI, § 2.
29 ILL CONST. art. X, § 1.
3 (0 0mo CONST. art. XII, § 2.
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object of levy. It is there, it cannot be moved out of the state, and it is a
recourse for payment. Property serves as a basis for determining how
much to draw from the individual. The form of tax is a way of distribut-
ing the burden among the citizenry. We all know, however, that the tax
is not on property. The tax is on people. The property mechanism is a
means, as I have said, of distributing the burden and measuring the tax.
But it is fraught with vagaries and unevenness in administration and
application. So it does seem to me that it is time to reexamine the prop-
erty tax in extenso.
It should be noted, however, that if the property tax is to be retained,
the constitutional limits should be removed and discretion as to the limita-
tion should be left with the legislature. Why preserve a fixed limit in
preference to freedom of policy choice? It is to be borne in mind that the
tax limitation covers debt service levies on bonds-that is, principal and
interest requirements-as well as levies for current expenses. This mems,
of course, that it operates as an indirect debt limitation on unvoted general
obligation bonds.
What I am brought to at this stage is a suggestion that a revised Ohio
constitution eschew reliance upon the property tax, except to the extent it
may be unalterably committed to cover principal and nterest requirements
on outstanding general obligation bonds, and leave the legislature and
local units in a position to rely on other sources of revenue, notably, grad-
uated income taxes, consumption taxes and charges for services. It is
highly important that the legislature be left in a position to take the req-
uisite state action to achieve rational and constructive coordination of
national, state, and local revenue systems insofar -; the state is concerned.
I am aware that a small local unit can hardly be expected to administer a
graduated income tax, but that does not defeat us. It is possible for a local
unit to levy an income tax or sales tax as a supplement to a corresponding
state tax. For example, the rate of the local income tax might be a frac-
tion of that for the state. Thus, the supplement could be collected by the
state in a single administration. What was collected in the way of local
revenue would be returned to the levying unit.
I turn to a different aspect of taxation. We find that forces committed
to motor vehicles in one way or another have been influential enough to
obtain constitutional dedication of motor vehicle and gasoline tax rev-
enues to highway purposes in Ohio3 and a number of other states. Now,
of course, we all like to have automobiles. We depend upon them. But
it does seem to me that our commitment to them has had an incredibly
powerful and pervasive influence upon the entire society, and upon urban
communities and regions in particular, and not always in a wholesome
sense.
31 OHIo CoNsr. art. XII, § 5a.
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The tax dedication just mentioned is a painful expression of that com-
mitment. It is unsound, in the first place, to make a constitutional dedi-
cation of revenues to the exclusion of the exercise of legislative discretion
in the use of public funds as unfolding developments and societal needs
indicate. In other words, the level at which decisions as to how tax money
shall be spent should not be that of the constitution. The money should
flow into the general fund and the legislature should be the responsible
body to determine how the money shall be spent for authorized public
purposes, or so it seems to me. The instant dedication is particularly bad
because it nurtures a great distortion in the social circulatory system, which
is increasingly hazardous to the social organism.
The social circulatory system consists not simply of highways; there are
all sorts of components, which include, for example, mass transportation,
various termini, and facilities for walking. I think it is a proper concep-
tion to speak of the whole complex of these various components as a cir-
culatory system for the entire social organism. Streets and highways are
but one important element.
The effect of the revenue dedication is to influence the circulatory sys-
tem in such a way as to mould the very character and shape of the organ-
ism. You need only look at suburban sprawl to see its handiwork. I
would say that, to the extent that such moneys are dedicated and pledged
through outstanding bonds, the state, of course, should honor its commit-
ment. -32  But beyond that I would urge that the constitutional commit-
ment of these funds to highway purposes is not sound and should be
abandoned.
As I come to the topic of local borrowing, I make a fresh assault on
the property tax. Traditionally, general obligation bonds of local units
have been supported by a commitment to the levying and collecting of
property taxes from year to year to cover debt services. The Ohio consti-
tution exacts that there be taxes provided from year to year, and I inter-
pret this to mean property taxes, so that we have a commitment in the
constitution on this. The time has come to break the shackles of the
property tax system. Just as the corporate mortgage, which used to be
regarded as the necessary security behind corporate bonds, has been largely
outmoded by economic realities, the security behind municipal bonds
should be seen, I think, to be the general strength, stability and respon-
sible management of the borrowing community. So it is, of course, with
the formal obligations of the United States; the commitment is of the gen-
eral faith and credit of the borrower without reference to any particular
tax source of payment. So, for the future, issuance of municipal obliga-
32 With respect to contract clause implications see Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 WaiL)
535 (1866).
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tions comparable to corporate debentures might well be the order of the
day.
The home rule amendment of 1912 expressly authorized municipalities
to issue mortgage revenue bonds to finance utility plants and systems.
As you all know, revenue bonds are bonds issued to finance facilities cal-
culated to produce enough revenue to cover principal and interest as well
as to operate the facilities.
The Ohio scheme was to have a mortgage in addition. That may
have beena sound conception back in 1912, but I wonder whether the
mortgage feature is significant. The basic source of payment is revenue,
which, in turn, depends upon the soundness of the enterprise. Is foreclo-
sure of a mortgage upon a municipal water system with an attendant fran-
chise for private operation a consummation even to be contemplated, let
alone devoutly to be wished? The point, in short, is that simple revenue
bonds are the desirable form. It does not take express constitutional au-
thorization to provide for such financing. The power exists now in Ohio
under the general home rule grant13
In conclusion I like to think that for constitutional revision purposes
there runs through what I have said a consistent strain of thought, even
though there are many topics involved. The keynote is flexibility, which,
as I see it, bespeaks constitutional change directed to the strengthening of
basic state and local governmental institutipns and processes with stress all
the while upon responsible action rather than upon the hedging of author-
ity.
33 State exrel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951).
